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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found thirty-five-year-old David George Herod guilty
of two counts of felony lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. On each count, the
district court imposed a concurrent unified sentence of twenty-five years, with seven
years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Herod asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
allowed one of the State’s expert witnesses to testify on how she determined whether
an allegation is false, because her testimony passed upon the credibility of the
complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s function.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
T.W., a ten-year-old minor girl, reported to her mother that Mr. Herod had
touched her on two separate occasions. (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI),
p.3; Trial Tr., p.56, L.16 – p.57, L.13.)1 Nampa Police Department officers directed
T.W.’s mother to make a confrontation call to Mr. Herod, and Mr. Herod, during the
confrontation call and a following call, denied any sexual contact occurred. (See Trial
Tr., p.295, L.2 – p.299, L.12; State’s Exs. 4 & 5.) Another ten-year-old minor girl, A.M.,
also reported to her parents that Mr. Herod had touched her in two separate incidents.
(See PSI, p.3; Trial Tr., p.334, Ls.3-12.)
Mr. Herod was charged by Indictment with one count of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-1508, against T.W., and one count

All citations to the “Trial Transcript” refer to the 386-page PDF that includes the
transcripts from July 9, 2014, Day 1 Trial, and July 10, 2014, Day 2 Trial.
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of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen against A.M. (R., pp.23-24.) Mr. Herod
entered a plea of not guilty. (R., pp.30-31.)
The case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.121-31.) During T.W.’s testimony,
Mr. Herod moved for a mistrial, and the district court granted the motion for a mistrial.
(R., pp.129-30.) The district court reset the jury trial. (R., p.131.)
The district court then conducted Mr. Herod’s second jury trial. (R., pp.148-65.)
T.W. was the State’s first witness. (R., pp.152-53.)

T.W. testified that she had been

best friends with Mr. Herod’s younger daughter.2 (Trial Tr., p.26, L.24 – p.27, L.5, p.30,
Ls.16-20) When T.W. spent the night at Mr. Herod’s house for a slumber party, T.W.,
Mr. Herod’s younger daughter, and Mr. Herod slept on the couch in the living room.
(Trial Tr., p.31, L.24 – p.32, L.6.) Mr. Herod’s older daughter and two of his sons were
sleeping on the floor. (Trial Tr., p.35, Ls.12-16.) T.W. testified that after everyone was
asleep, she was woken up by Mr. Herod moving his hand in a circle around her nipple.
(See Trial Tr., p.37, L.17 – p.41, L.5.) When she moved, he pulled his hand away.
(Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.23-25.) T.W. testified that Mr. Herod told her not to tell anyone.
(Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.10-16.)
T.W. testified she spent the night at Mr. Herod’s again (Trial Tr., p.44, Ls.1-5),
and T.W., Mr. Herod’s younger daughter, and Mr. Herod slept on the couch. (Trial
Tr., p.45, L.7 – p.46, L.4.) T.W. testified she fell asleep and woke up to Mr. Herod
touching her lower private part inside her clothes with his hand. (Trial Tr., p.46, Ls.518.) During the touching, he told her not to tell anyone. (Trial Tr., p.47, Ls.23-25.) T.W.

Mr. Herod’s two daughters and one of his sons were from his previous marriage, and
another son was from his fiancée’s previous marriage. (See Trial Tr., p.363, L.1 –
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testified that Mr. Herod stopped after she moved, and then he started to cry and said he
was sorry. (Trial Tr., p.48, L.23 – p.49, L.16.)
T.W. testified she spent the night at Mr. Herod’s another time without incident,
but the following morning T.W. and Mr. Herod were on the couch and Mr. Herod pulled
her over by her feet, put a blanket on top of her, and made her touch his lower private
part underneath the clothes. (Trial Tr., p.52, L.16 – p.56, L.20.) Mr. Herod’s daughters
were in the kitchen at the time. (Trial Tr., p.54, Ls.12-14.) When T.W. pulled away,
Mr. Herod tried to grab her hand again.

(Trial Tr., p.52, Ls.21-25.)

T.W. testified

Mr. Herod told her to move her hand towards the bottom. (Trial Tr., p.56, Ls.7-10.)
T.W. then told Mr. Herod’s daughter about the touching, and later went home and
reported it to her mother. (Trial Tr., p.56, L.16 – p.57, L.2.)
A.M. subsequently testified for the State. (R., p.159.) A.M. testified she was
friends with both of Mr. Herod’s daughters. (See Tr., p.311, L.17 – p.312, L.14.) She
was also friends with T.W. (Tr., p.314, L.24 – p.315, L.2.) A.M. testified that Mr. Herod
would tickle her when she went over to the house. (Tr., p.320, Ls.6-11.)
A.M. testified that two incidents happened between her and Mr. Herod.
(Tr., p.321, Ls.2-7.)

Before the first incident, A.M., Mr. Herod, and Mr. Herod’s

daughters were sleeping on the couch in the living room.

(Tr., p.321, Ls.8-20.)

Mr. Herod’s sons were sleeping on the floor. (Tr., p.323, Ls.12-16.) A.M. testified she
woke up to Mr. Herod touching her private part underneath her clothes with his hand.
(Tr., p.323, L.17 – p.324, L.4.) A.M. testified that Mr. Herod also pulled her hand next to

p.364, L.6.) Mr. Herod and his fiancée, Kimber Thompson, had a third son together.
(Trial Tr., p.364, Ls.6-12.)
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his pants, but she pulled away and moved. (Tr., p.325, Ls.13-23.) Mr. Herod told her
not to tell anyone. (Tr., p.326, Ls.8-11.)
A.M. testified that before the second incident, she was sleeping in the backyard
in a tent with Mr. Herod, Mr. Herod’s older daughter, and one of his sons. (Tr., p.327,
Ls.8-24.) She woke up to Mr. Herod crying and saying he was sorry and did not know
why he did that. (Tr., p.330, Ls.12-17.) A.M. testified Mr. Herod then brought out a
“massage thing” and tried to touch her with it. (Tr., p.331, Ls.1-7.) She did not see the
massage thing, but could hear it buzzing. (Tr., p.331, Ls.8-15.) A.M. testified that
earlier that night, Mr. Herod asked her if she wanted him to never touch her again, and
she replied yes. (See Tr., p.331, L.21 – p.332, L.11.)
A.M. testified that, on a later date, Mr. Herod stated T.W. had reported Mr. Herod
touched her, but he did not. (Tr., p.333, Ls.5-19.) He told A.M. she might be pulled out
of school and asked questions, and Mr. Herod’s daughters might be moving to
California with their mom.

(Tr., p.333, L.20 – p.334, L.2.)

A.M. testified she then

decided to tell her parents. (Tr., p.334, Ls.3-10.)
The State called Alisa Ortega as an expert witness between T.W. and A.M. (See
R., pp.155-56.)

Ms. Ortega was a pediatric nurse practitioner and responsible for

examining children at the Children At Risk Evaluation Services (CARES) clinic at
St. Luke’s Hospital. (Trial Tr., p.132, L.13 – p.134, L.10.) Ms. Ortega testified she also
diagnosed children who came into CARES with sexual abuse. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.4-9.)
She explained the process a child undergoes at CARES, including the forensic interview
and physical examination. (Trial Tr., p.135, L.22 – p.138, L.23.) Over Mr. Herod’s
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objection, the district court allowed Ms. Ortega to testify on how she determined
whether an allegation is false. (Trial Tr., p.153, L.9 – p.154, L.9.)
Ms. Ortega testified that she had watched A.M.’s forensic interview (Trial
Tr., p.158, Ls.15-17), and then she conducted a physical examination of A.M. (Trial
Tr., p.169, Ls.19-25.)

Ms. Ortega did not conduct a genital examination after A.M.

refused one. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.1-7.) Had she done a genital examination, she would
not have expected to find any injury or trauma. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.17-21.) Ms. Ortega
testified her ultimate diagnosis “was that the sexual abuse should strongly be
considered.” (Trial Tr., p.170, L.22 – p.171, L.2.)

On cross-examination, Ms. Ortega

testified there were no physical findings. (Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.8-10.)
Mr. Herod called his fiancée, Kimber Thompson, as a witness. (R., pp.159-60.)
Ms. Thompson testified that Mr. Herod routinely slept on the couch in the living room
because Ms. Thompson could not handle his snoring and she had been pregnant.
(Trial Tr., p.364, L.25 – p.365, L.16.)

The children’s bedrooms only had small

bunkbeds. (Trial Tr., p.369, Ls.1-7.) She testified that they always had children over to
the house to play on the weekends and during the summer. (Trial Tr., p.370, L.13 –
p.371, L.2.) Mr. Herod engaged in roughhousing with his kids and tickled and played
games with them, and that he treated the kids who came over like his own kids. (Trial
Tr., p.373, Ls.10-22.) When Mr. Herod and some of the children were camping in a tent
in a backyard, it was initially just the kids in the tent, but the children begged Mr. Herod
to come outside because they were scared of zombies. (Trial Tr., p.374, L.22 - p.375,
L.3.) Otherwise, Mr. Herod would always sleep in the same place on the couch. (Trial
Tr., p.375, L.23 – p.377, L.3.) Mr. Herod did not testify. (See R., pp.160-62.)
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The jury found Mr. Herod guilty on both counts of lewd conduct. (R., pp.204-05.)
On each count, the district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with
seven years fixed. (R., pp.245-47.) The sentences were to be serverd concurrently.
(R., p.245.)
Mr. Herod filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment and
Commitment. (R., pp.269-71.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Ms. Ortega to testify on how
she determined whether an allegation is false, because her testimony passed upon the
credibility of the complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s function?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Ms. Ortega To Testify On How
She Determined Whether An Allegation Is False, Because Her Testimony Passed Upon
The Credibility Of The Complaining Witnesses And Thereby Usurped The
Jury’s Function
A.

Introduction
Mr. Herod asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed

Ms. Ortega to testify on how she determined whether an allegation is false, because
Ms. Ortega’s testimony passed upon the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurped
the jury’s function.
During the direct examination of Ms. Ortega, the State asked her if she
considered or looked at “the child’s disclosure to see if this is a false allegation?” (Trial
Tr., p.153, Ls.5-7.) After Ms. Ortega replied that she did, the State asked: “What sort of
things do you look at to determine whether the allegation is false?” (Trial Tr., p.153,
Ls.8-10.) Ms. Ortega gave the following answer:
We look at how much detail the child can give. If they’re not able to
give any detail, well, he did this and that’s it, you know, you start to
question. You know, they’re asked well, you know, how were your
clothes? What were you wearing? If they’re not able to give any type of
detail about how it may have felt or what they heard or saw or anything
like that, you start to question a little bit.
Now, if they’re able to give a lot of detail, well, they were wearing
this, this, this, and this, I was wearing this, you know, it felt like this, you
know, then you think okay, it’s probably true, probably plausible.
(Trial Tr., p.153, Ls.11-24.)
Counsel for Mr. Herod then objected: “Judge, I’m going to object that that line of
questioning basically gets to asking for credibility of the person. It’s not in the province
of the—it’s in the province of the jury, not of the witness.” (Trial Tr., p.153, L.25 – p.154,
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L.4.) The State contended Ms. Ortega was “not giving an opinion as to whether it is or
not. This is factual information. And in [State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688 (1988)] it’s
appropriate line of questioning.”

(Trial Tr., p.154, Ls.5-8.)

The district court then

overruled Mr. Herod’s objection. (Trial Tr., p.154, L.9.)
Before Ms. Ortega testified, T.W. testified on direct examination, regarding the
first occasion, that she thought she was wearing her clothes as opposed to pajamas
(Trial Tr., p.38, L.25 – p.39, L.4), and that Mr. Herod had moved his hand in a circle
around her nipple (Trial Tr., p.40, L.5 – p.41, L.5). With respect to the second occasion,
T.W. had testified she was wearing clothes (see Trial Tr., p.46, Ls.14-18), and
Mr. Herod had made skin-to-skin contact with his finger on her genitals (Trial Tr., p.46,
L.8 – p.47, L.6). On cross examination, T.W. testified that Mr. Herod had clothes on
during the first occasion. (Trial Tr., p.70, Ls.22-23.)
After Ms. Ortega’s testimony, A.M. testified on direct examination, regarding the
first incident, that she woke up to Mr. Herod touching her private part with his hand
(Trial Tr., p.323, Ls.19-23), he was making an in-out motion underneath her clothes
(Trial Tr., p.324, Ls.2-14), and Mr. Herod was wearing pants (see Trial Tr., p.325, Ls.1921). Regarding the second incident in the tent, A.M. testified she was wearing clothes.
(See Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.3-9.)
The district court should have sustained the objection to Ms. Ortega’s testimony,
because her testimony passed upon the credibility of the complaining witnesses and
thereby usurped the jury’s function.
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B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
A district court’s decision to allow expert testimony is within the discretion of the

district court and will not be set aside absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853 (2001). When an appellate court reviews a district
court’s discretionary decision, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into
(1) whether the district court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether
the district court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,

600 (1989).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge with assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form on an opinion or
otherwise.” I.R.E. 702. Conversely, “[w]here the normal experience and qualification of
lay jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions from given facts and circumstances,
expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible.” Varie, 135 Idaho at 853-54 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[i]n general, expert
testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another witness
encroaches upon the jury’s vital and exclusive function to make credibility
determinations, and therefore does not assist the trier of fact as required by Rule 702.”
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

10

The Court in Perry also held that “an expert’s opinion, in a proper case, is
admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would require the expert to
pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence. To venture
beyond that point, however, is to usurp the jury’s function.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696 (1988)). According to the Court,
“[i]t is the jury’s function to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and made a
determination of credibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]tatements by a
witness as to whether another witness is telling the truth are prohibited.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
C.

Ms. Ortega’s Testimony Passed Upon The Credibility Of The Complaining
Witnesses And Thereby Usurped The Jury’s Function
Mr. Herod asserts that Ms. Ortega’s testimony on how she determined whether

an allegation was false passed upon the credibility of the complaining witnesses and
thereby usurped the jury’s function. By the time Ms. Ortega testified regarding what
details would lead her to conclude an allegation of child sexual abuse was probably true
(Trial Tr., p.153, Ls.11-24), the jury had already heard T.W. give those types of details
in her testimony. (See Trial Tr., p.38, L.25 – p.39, L.4, p.40, L.5 – p.41, L.5, p.46, L.8 –
p.47, L.6, p.70, Ls.22-23.) After Ms. Ortega’s testimony, A.M. likewise provided those
types of details in her testimony. (See Trial Tr., p.323, Ls.19-23, p.324, Ls.2-14, p.325,
Ls.19-21, p.332, Ls.3-9.)
Thus, Ms. Ortega’s testimony indirectly vouched for the truth of T.W.’s and A.M.’s
accounts. Her testimony was “useful to bolster [the witnesses’] credibility but [did] not
provide the trier of fact with any additional information” that pertained to the case. See
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Perry, 139 Idaho at 525. Because credibility questions are left to the jury, the testimony
did not “help the trier of fact to find facts or understand the evidence as required by
I.R.E. 702.” See id. Put otherwise, with her testimony, Ms. Ortega “usurp[ed] the role of
the jury as the ultimate finder of credibility.” See id.
That Ms. Ortega’s testimony usurped the jury’s function is further shown by the
State’s questions during voir dire on how prospective jurors would determine whether
an allegation is false. For example, the State asked Juror No. 374: “What sort of things
would you look at to determine whether or not it’s a truthful allegation? What sort of
things would you want to hear?” (Voir Dire Tr., p.71, L.24 – p.72, L.2.)3 The State later
asked, “Juror No. 443, how about you? Do you feel like you can look at someone and
decide and listen to them and decide if they’re being truthful or not?”
Tr., p.72, Ls.18-21.)

(Voir Dire

The State subsequently asked Juror No. 265, a high school

teacher, “[h]ow are you able to tell if the teenager is lying on occasion?” (Voir Dire
Tr., p.74, Ls.12-13.) Still later, the State asked Juror No. 247: “So, as a juror, you’ll
have the ability to believe some, all, or none of what each witness says. What are you
going to look at to decide whether or not you believe them?” (Voir Dire Tr., p.81, Ls.1215.)

The prospective juror replied, “[w]hat they say, how they say it.”

Tr., p.81, 16-17.)

(Voir Dire

Those questions to the prospective jurors indicate the State

recognized that the jury’s function is to made credibility determinations. By posing the
same type of question to Ms. Ortega, the State set the stage for her testimony to usurp
the jury’s function.

All citations to the “Voir Dire Transcript” refer to the 214-page PDF that includes
transcripts of the voir dire examination, jury instruction conferences, and opening
statements from July 9, 2014, Day 1 Trial.
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Although the State argued before the district court that Ms. Ortega’s testimony
was admissible under Hester (see Trial Tr., p.154, Ls.5-8), the testimony found to be
admissible in Hester is readily distinguishable.

Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court

in Hester held that a qualified expert may, under Rule 702, render an opinion that a
child had been sexually abused. Hester, 114 Idaho at 692-93. There was evidence of
physical trauma against the child alleged victim in Hester. See id. at 689-90. In that
context, the Hester Court held “[w]hether a child has been sexually abused is beyond
common experience and allowing an expert to testify on this issue will assist the trier of
fact.” See id. at 693 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, in this
case Ms. Ortega testified there were “no physical findings.” (See Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.810.)

Further, as the State’s voir dire questions suggested, making credibility

determinations is not beyond the common experience of the jury. Thus, the admissible
testimony in Hester is distinguishable from Ms. Ortega’s testimony on how to determine
whether an allegation is false.
Indeed, Ms. Ortega’s testimony is more akin to the expert testimony the Hester
Court found inadmissible. The Hester Court held expert testimony on the defendant’s
identity as the abuser of the child alleged victim was improperly admitted because it
“only served to impermissibly evaluate the circumstances and render the same
conclusion the jury was asked to render by its verdict.” Hester, 114 Idaho at 696. The
Hester Court observed that “[a]lthough the field of child abuse may be ‘beyond common
experience,’ having an expert render an opinion as to the identity of the abuser is more
of an invasion of the jury’s function rather than an ‘assist’ to the trier of fact.” Id. at 695.
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Ms. Ortega’s testimony, by passing upon the credibility of the complaining witnesses,
was similarly an invasion of the jury’s function.
Ms. Ortega’s testimony on how she determined whether an allegation was false
passed upon the credibility of the complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s
function. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Ms. Ortega to
testify on how she determined whether an allegation is false.
D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove The District Court’s Abuse Of Discretion
Was Harmless
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the

appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

See

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To hold an error as harmless, an appellate
court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Mr. Herod asserts the State will be unable to prove the district court’s abuse of
discretion in allowing Ms. Ortega’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The credibility of the complaining witnesses was central to the State’s case.

As

discussed above, there were no physical findings. (See, e.g., p.181, Ls.8-10.) Thus,
the State’s case hinged on the jury finding T.W. and A.M. to be credible. By usurping
the jury’s function to determine credibility, Ms. Ortega’s testimony created the risk that
the jury would find the complaining witnesses credible not because of the jury’s own
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determination, but because a qualified expert had already determined T.W. and A.M.
were credible. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1998) (observing,
in a case upholding the per se exclusion of polygraph results in military trials, that
jurisdictions “may legitimately be concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive
weight to the opinions of a polygrapher . . . .

Such jurisdictions may legitimately

determine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to
abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt”); see also Perry, 139 Idaho at 523-24
(discussing Scheffer). Thus, the State will be unable to prove the district court’s abuse
of

discretion

in

allowing

Ms.

Ortega’s

testimony

was

harmless

beyond

a

reasonable doubt.
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Ms. Ortega to
testify on how she determined whether an allegation is false, because Ms. Ortega’s
testimony passed upon the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurped the
jury’s function. The State will be unable to prove the district court’s abuse of discretion
in allowing Ms. Ortega’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the
district court’s judgment should be reversed and the case should be remanded for a
new trial. See Hester, 114 Idaho at 700.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Herod respectfully requests this Court reverse the
judgment of the district court and remand the case for a new trial.
DATED this 11th day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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